

**Rwanda, Kigali, April 6<sup>th</sup> 1994**

**DESTRUCTION OF THE FALCON 50**

**A military deception operation**

Translated to English by underlying

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### **On reading Other Gentlemen's Mail**

General: ... *Incidentally, they know your code.*

*We know they know our code. ... We only give them things we want them to know.*

General: ..... *Incidentally, they know you know their code.*

Soviet Ambassador (smiling): ... *We have known for some time that they knew we knew their code. We have acted accordingly - by pretending to be duped.*

General: .... *Incidentally, you know - they know you know they know you know...*

American Ambassador (genuinely alarmed): *What? Are you sure?*

*Peter Ustinov, Romanoff and Juliet, act 2.*<sup>1</sup>

## **The downing of the Falcon 50**

The April 6<sup>th</sup> 1994 attack on President Habyarimana's Presidential Falcon 50 remains an unsolved mystery mainly because no rigorous methodology was used to solve it. On the other hand, the subject has often been treated with a strong militant bias consisting in listing the facts incriminating the opposing side while minimizing or concealing the facts that could incriminate the faction that one wished, more or less openly, to defend. This confirmation bias, coupled with militant blindness and heightened by the seriousness of the genocide, very quickly amplified the emotional dimension of the discussion.

To make things clear from the outset, there was indeed one genocide of Tutsis in 1994 and not two genocides. The ICTR defendants were indicted for the seriousness of their crimes, but of the 800'000 to 1'000'000 deaths estimated during the three months of the genocide, the majority of the victims were not Tutsis, according to the work of professors Christian Davenport (University of Michigan) and Allan Stam (University of Virginia).<sup>2</sup>

The aim of this report is to contribute to solve this enigma, regardless of who the perpetrators are.

To get out of this blindness, all that is needed is a little methodology and to consider only the irrefutable facts. This requires disregarding rumors, reported words and interpretations of texts that will always be open to discussion. An irrefutable fact is signaled by at least one clearly identifiable source whose reliability can be assessed. An irrefutable fact is a material fact that cannot be disputed. Finally, to avoid the confirmation bias, one can refer to the analysis of contradictory hypotheses, a method developed by Richard Heuer and used later in this report.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to the identification of irrefutable facts, we must add, regarding military operations, the art of trickery or deception. Since the dawn of time, the general has sought to deceive his adversary by more or less elaborated tricks. The Trojan Horse, the book of the 36 stratagems<sup>4</sup> or Operation Fortitude during the Normandy landing shows that the use of cunning

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<sup>1</sup> WHALEY Barton, *Codeword BARBAROSSA*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1973, p.150.

<sup>2</sup> <https://genodynamics.weebly.com/4-things-about-rwanda-1994.html>

<sup>3</sup> Heuer Richards, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999, 214 pages.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.underlying.ch/2019-11-06-les-36-stratgemes>

can make a major contribution to victory and can be part of virtually every military operation at the tactical or strategical level.

The objective of a deception operation is to influence a target, through specific channels of communication, to carry out a specific action that is contrary to its interests. Any deception operation is part of an environment in which it must blend in order to remain unnoticed until its completion. And even after it is completed, the constituent elements of the deception operation must remain difficult to identify.

But in this case, the elements identified in this report suggest that the Falcon 50 was shot down by a RPF-friendly movement with discreet but decisive support from Belgium and the United States.

## **The Arusha Accords about power sharing**

In August 1993, the Arusha Agreements were finally signed. They provide for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government (BBTG) after which free elections had to be held to enable Rwandan citizens to elect their representatives. The deployment of UNAMIR<sup>5</sup>, which began in November 1993, was intended to accompany the establishment of the BBTG.

According to these agreements, President Habyarimana would preside an investiture ceremony where he himself, members of the parties designated to sit as ministers in the BBTG as well as the deputies of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) must take an oath and swear that they will apply these same agreements. However, Habyarimana remains very concerned as he fears a form of institutional coup. Indeed, he is afraid of being indicted for the crimes he committed during his seizure of power and all the other crimes that have punctuated his regime. To avoid this risk, he must retain absolute control over at least one of the following three elements:

1. The Constitutional Court, whose president, Joseph Kavaruganda, a former follower of Habyarimana, has joined the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR). Habyarimana has limited confidence in him because he has the power to open criminal proceedings against the head of state. He therefore does not control this element.
2. The post of Minister of Justice is claimed by Liberal Party (PL) candidate Aloys Niyoyita who is clearly pro-RPF. Unsurprisingly, Habyarimana has no confidence in him. He therefore does not control this element.
3. The simple majority in the NTA allows any indictment of the presidency to be blocked. This is the only aspect he can hope to control.

Initially, given the balance of power that prevailed at the time the Arusha accords were signed, the presidential movement could only count on fourteen deputies out of seventy: eleven from its own ranks and three from the so-called Pygmy parties<sup>6</sup> because they are represented by a single deputy such as MFBP, PPJR, PECO, PDI, PADER, PARERWA or RTD. However, following the

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<sup>5</sup> UNAMIR United Nations Mission in Rwanda. A blue helmet force.

<sup>6</sup> So called because they were represented by only one MP. Not very representative, they were used either by the presidential movement or by the pro-RPF movement to occupy the field and weigh in the balance.

assassination of Burundian President Ndadaye in October 1993, the first Hutu elected president in neighboring Burundi, most Rwandan political parties split into two factions, one still pro-RPF and the other Power (i.e. the Hutu Power), which was in favor of the presidential movement. The MDR, originally 100% pro-RPF, found itself divided and of the eleven deputies who were to sit in the NTA, only six could be considered pro-RPF. The situation was similar to that of the PL, where five out of eleven deputies joined the Hutu Power faction. Consequently, the presidential movement could hope to approach a simple majority.

According to the Arusha Accords, the NTA was supposed to have 70 members but the last available list<sup>7</sup> included only 68 names, which means that two seats were still not filled. Political parties that were not represented in the government, but wanted to be represented in the NTA, had to sign the code of political ethics beforehand.<sup>8</sup>

Among the unrepresented parties was the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR), created in March 1992 by the hardliners of the regime and extremely hostile to Tutsis and to any negotiations with the RPF. In January 1993, the decision to allocate five ministerial posts to the RPF triggered the anger of CDR supporters and many Tutsis and members of opposition parties were killed. Their number was estimated at 400 dead and 20'000 displaced. The RPF's refusal to accept a seat for such an extremist party as the CDR is therefore legitimate. However, Habyarimana will make it a stumbling block by making his acceptance of the establishment of the BBTG conditional on the allocation of a seat in the NTA to the CDR.

With one CDR deputy, the presidential movement could count on 34 deputies being favorable to him against 35 pro-RPF. Knowing that a seat for the MDR was in the balance between Jean Tegeri (Power) and Sylvestre Kamali (RPF), the presidential movement could hope to achieve a simple majority within the NTA. The allocation of a seat for the CDR in the NTA was therefore not a secondary issue and could tip the balance of political power on the side of the presidential movement or on the pro-RPF side. Moreover, if Habyarimana managed to obtain a simple majority, he could approach the elections scheduled at the end of the transition period with serenity. Indeed, at the end of 1993, municipal elections were held in northern Rwanda, then totally under the control of the RPF, and not a single RPF candidate was elected.

These games should not hide the fact that the situation on the ground remained very tense. On both sides, a double game was being played and each side was strengthening its military position. If the main objective of the Arusha agreements was to facilitate a peaceful sharing of power, this objective was not shared by the ultras on both sides, and the attack on Habyarimana made it possible to unblock the situation by triggering the *infernal machine*.

If the Hutu Power supporters were at the origin of the shooting, they could take advantage of the psychological shock to eliminate political opponents in Kigali whose lists had already been drawn up and take power after a Coup.

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<sup>7</sup> Annexe n°37 [http://rwandadelaguerreraugenocide.univ-paris1.fr/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Annexe\\_1.pdf](http://rwandadelaguerreraugenocide.univ-paris1.fr/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Annexe_1.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> Provided for in Article 80 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front on power-sharing in the framework of a broad-based transitional government. See Article 61. [www.francegenocidetutsi.org/ProtocolePartagePouvoir9janvier1993.pdf](http://www.francegenocidetutsi.org/ProtocolePartagePouvoir9janvier1993.pdf)

If the RPF supporters were at the origin of the shooting, the predictable triggering of the infernal machine by the hardcore Hutu Power offered a legitimate reason to intervene to stop the massacres and, in the wake, take power.

On the opposite, if there had been no attack on Habyarimana, it would have been difficult for the Hutu Power to trigger the infernal machine without the psychological shock induced by the death of the president and for the RPF to intervene because Habyarimana was dragging his feet in the establishment of the BBTG. Only his brutal death made it possible to set the infernal machine in motion. Since no one could openly assume the assassination of the president, **it was necessary to lay the blame on his opponent.**

### **Bait for an ambush...**

On March 9<sup>th</sup> 1994, the RPF entered into direct discussions with the CDR to find a solution to its participation in the NTA because the NTA had to be installed. UNAMIR was called upon to find a solution to their dispute and after five hours of discussions, the first Vice-President of the RPF and the acting Chairman of the CDR<sup>9</sup> made separate statements whose moderate tone heralded further meetings, far from the invectives that had marked the end of the MRND<sup>10</sup>-RPF discussions on 27 January. Clearly, the CDR agreed to adopt a more moderate political line, but the RPF has not yet formally accepted the presence of a CDR deputy in the NTA.

On March 19<sup>th</sup>, the final list of NTA members was presented on national radio by the Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana (MDR), but it still didn't include a CDR representative because the code of ethics related to the Arusha Accords recognizing the validity of the agreements and the agreement to abide by them has not yet been signed.

On March 22<sup>nd</sup>, Agathe Uwilingiyimana informed the population on the radio that the problem of the CDR had been resolved because it accepted the Arusha Accords and the code of ethics. She also stated that the RPF, under these conditions, agreed to the CDR's participation in the NTA. Information confirmed by Booh-Booh<sup>11</sup> in the SITREP<sup>12</sup> of March 23<sup>rd</sup> 1994 sent to Koffi Annan. However, the RPF still didn't agree that the CDR should be represented at the NTA and Booh-Booh organized a new meeting on March 24 at 5:00 p.m. at the Amahoro Hotel.<sup>13</sup>

On the 25<sup>th</sup>, a new ceremony of induction of the BBTG was planned but following a new disagreement in the composition of the lists, the RPF refrained from participating and the ceremony was cancelled. A new attempt was planned for the 28<sup>th</sup> but was unsuccessful, the two remaining points of disagreement being the identity of the Liberal Party minister and the possible association of the CDR with the peace process. On the same day, the Tanzanian Minister of

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<sup>9</sup> They are Patrick Mazimpaka (RPF) and Théoneste Nahimana (CDR).

<sup>10</sup> MRND: Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement. The political party of president Habyarimana.

<sup>11</sup> Booh-Booh Jacques-Roger, Cameroonian diplomat, head of UNAMIR.

<sup>12</sup> SITREP: Situation report. Daily report sent to New York.

<sup>13</sup> ICTR-99-52-T RTLM Transcript, March 25, 1994. Interview of Jean Bosco Barayagwiza by Georges Ruggiu, p.7.

Foreign Affairs, Joseph Rwegasira, convened a meeting of the ambassadors of the Great Lakes Region in Arusha.

It was then that the acting president of the CDR launched a very effective public relations campaign aimed at the political forces that had signed the Arusha peace agreement and the president of the Constitutional Court, the depository of the agreement. All the persons contacted, with the exception of the RPF, spontaneously agreed to have their copy of the peace agreement signed by the CDR and, consequently, to give their assent to its inclusion in the peace process by granting a deputy post to the NTA.

It is on the basis of these latest developments that the international community held a meeting on March 28<sup>th</sup> at the residence of the French embassy, attended by the apostolic nuncio and dean of the diplomatic corps, the ambassadors of France, Belgium, Germany, the United States, Zaire, Burundi, Egypt and Uganda, as well as the UN special representative. They unanimously adopted a declaration in which they suggested that the CDR be given a post of MP and that in return, Habyarimana commit himself to stop multiplying obstacles to the implementation of the peace agreement.<sup>14</sup> The diplomatic corps underlined that it would exclude the CDR if it didn't respect the democratic rules.

Canadian General Dallaire was furious and accused Booh-Booh of having validated Habyarimana's maneuver.<sup>15</sup> According to Booh-Booh, "*on March 29, the RPF leaders became appallingly angry, forgetting that it was they themselves who had initiated the dialogue with the CDR*".<sup>16</sup> At the same time, the regional summit planned in Arusha was moved to Dar-es-Salaam for April 6<sup>th</sup>. The move of the Rwandan President was thus known eight days before the attack.

On Saturday April 2<sup>nd</sup>, in Gisenyi, Booh-Booh<sup>17</sup> informed Habyarimana of Boutros-Ghali's hesitation to renew UNAMIR in case the political problems were not resolved. The pressure from the international community was very strong because the Security Council was due to meet on 5 April to decide on the renewal of UNAMIR. Booh-Booh and Habyarimana did not speak directly about the CDR because other dignitaries from the hard wing were present. But his comments on the integration of the CDR showed that Habyarimana was aware of the pressure and threats against him. The sentence "*The Hutus would not forgive him*" was explicit enough.

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<sup>14</sup> Melvern Linda, *Conspiracy to Murder. The Rwandan Genocide*, janvier 2006, 263 pages.

pp.121-122 : "*On March 28, a statement issued by the diplomatic corps in Kigali urging the RPF to accept a CDR role in the transitional government was signed by the Secretary-General's special representative, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the Tanzanian facilitator to the Arusha Accords, the ambassadors of Belgium, France, Germany, the US, Burundi, Uganda and Zaire, and the dean of the diplomatic corps, the Papal Nuncio, Giuseppe Bertello.*"

<sup>15</sup> Dallaire Roméo, *Shake hands with the devil. The failure of humanity in Rwanda*, Arrow books, 2004, 561 pages. p.212: "*In one master stroke, Habyarimana had isolated the RPF as the sole party holding up the political process. The DPA in New York, the UN and the entire political and diplomatic community fell into his trap. We, the international community, caused the demise of Arusha the day all our diplomats, with the SRSG of the UN in the lead, accepted the president's gambit.*"

<sup>16</sup> Booh-Booh Jacques-Roger, *Dallaire's boss speaks. Révélations sur les dérives d'un général de l'ONU au Rwanda*, éditions Duboiris, 2005, pp.106 and 114.

<sup>17</sup> Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, *ibidem*, p.108.

On April 4<sup>th</sup>, Habyarimana and the Burundian president were in Gbadolite in the DRC for a meeting with Mobutu. According to Honoré Ngbanda Nzamo, the security adviser of Mobutu, Habyarimana appeared very nervous, as if he was stuck between the hammer and the anvil. He resented the Belgians and Americans who were pushing him to give in on the CDR, knowing that if he gave in, he would lose the game with his extremist wing. He was cornered. According to Nzamo, he had decided to go to the Dar es Salaam conference because he had no choice. On 5 April, the UN Security Council renewed UNAMIR's mandate for six months.

## **Closing the trap in Dar-es-Salaam**

On Wednesday April 6<sup>th</sup>, the summit, which should have started at 10.30 a.m., did not begin until 2 p.m. due to the late arrival of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. The summit brought together President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania, President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, Vice-President George Saitoti of Kenya, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim of the Organization of African Unity. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh received an invitation on April 6<sup>th</sup> at 9 a.m. to attend the meeting, which he declined.

There is no public record of this meeting and the content of the discussions, according to testimonies, differ. According to Gérard Prunier, who reports Museveni's comments, the discussion, initially planned on Burundi, switched on Rwanda and turned into an indictment against Habyarimana because of his refusal to implement the Arusha agreement. The offensive was led by Museveni and Ali Mwinyi, but even Ntaryamira, Habyarimana's Hutu brother and as such a supposed sympathizer, ended up speaking out and reproaching the Rwandan president for endangering the security of Burundi by his strategy of tension. Habyarimana faced an outcry of criticism mixed with implicit threats, should he not submit. President Museveni escorted a rather shaken Habyarimana to the airport and solemnly asked him to honor his signature.<sup>18</sup>

According to the testimony of Déo Ngendahayo, a member of the Burundian delegation present at the summit, President Habyarimana declared at the beginning of the conference that he was giving up his request that the CDR should have a MP seat in the NTA and that he would implement the Arusha Peace Accords as soon as he returned. From then on, there was no longer any obstacle to the establishment of the BBTG and the situation in Rwanda was only briefly mentioned. The summit then immediately turned its attention to the security situation in Burundi. The Burundian President explained to his peers the resistance he was facing in his attempts to initiate the reform of the Burundian army, without which the security situation could not improve.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Prunier Gérard, *Rwanda: the genocide*, Dagorno, 1997. Translation of *The Rwandan Crisis, History of a Genocide*, Hurst and Co, London, 1995, p. 255. Prunier got this information from President Museveni, whom he interviewed on 6 July 1994.

<sup>19</sup> Morel Jacques, *La France au cœur du génocide des Tutsi*, Izuba éditions, March 2015, 1567 pages. p. 308: "Deo Ndendahayo is a former deputy administrator of Burundi's State Security, in charge of the Central Intelligence Bureau (B.C.R.). He accompanied the Burundian president to Gbadolite on April 4. »

Several sources confirmed this version. Notably Braeckman, Vedrine as well as Jean-Christophe Belliard, First Secretary at the French Embassy in Tanzania.<sup>20</sup>

If Habyarimana's decision to set up the new institutions was known to some in Kigali before his departure from Dar-es-Salaam, his decision to give up on the CDR was not. Consequently, the question arises as to whether this news had reached Kigali before Habyarimana's return. According to Jean-Marc de la Sablière, Director of African and Malagasy Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay: *"The assassination of President Habyarimana occurred in the evening of 6 April 1994, at a time when we had the feeling that the Rwandans were finally reaching an agreement. This is the message that the President had given us before taking the plane, returning from a meeting in Dar-es-Salaam"*.<sup>21</sup> And according to the Belgian ambassador in Kigali, Johan Swinnen: *"we know that this decision taken in Dar-es-Salaam was communicated by the President in Kigali"*.<sup>22</sup> This telephone communication could have been intercepted by someone who would have triggered the whole operation.

By initiating direct dialogue with the CDR, the RPF opened the door to official recognition of the CDR, which resulted in the written and unanimous support of the international community. But Habyarimana, by focusing on the acceptance of the CDR within the NTA placed himself in an impossible situation because the RPF, at the time of the Dar-es-Salaam conference, had still not given its agreement. Indeed, summoned to install the BBTG, Habyarimana had to renounce de facto the admission of the CDR to the NTA, which would then make plausible the hypothesis that the Hutu Power was behind the attack.

## Facts reality check

### Facts that may incriminate Hutu Power supporters

#### **Constitution of lists of moderate Tutsi and Hutu to be executed in Kigali**

Several documents report these lists. *"In March 1993, following a traffic accident, a document was discovered in the vehicle of Colonel Déogratias Nsabimana, Chief of Staff. It was a list of 331 persons, supposedly agents or accomplices of the RPF on national territory or abroad"*.<sup>23</sup> In Kigali, on 20 February 1994, the Chief of Staff, meanwhile promoted to General, Deogratias Nsabimana, showed his cousin, Jean Birara, former governor of the National Bank of Rwanda, a list of 1'500 people to be shot. *"From the morning*

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<sup>20</sup> Braeckman Colette, Rwanda, Histoire d'un génocide, Fayard, November 1994, p.173. Paul Quilès, "Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise 1990-1994", National Assembly, report No. 1271, 15 December 1998. "Mission d'information de la commission de la Défense nationale et of the Armed Forces and the Foreign Affairs Commission on the military operations conducted by France, other countries and the UN in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994", p.200.

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dossiers/rwanda.asp>

Jean-Marc de la Sablière, Dans les coulisses du Monde. From Rwanda to the war in Iraq, a great negotiator reveals the underside of the cards, Robert Laffont, 2013, p.104.

<sup>22</sup> Hearing of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry of the Belgian Senate CRA 1-12, 12 March 1997, p. 136.

<sup>23</sup> Jacques Morel, ibidem, p.213.



of 7 April, the targeted executions were methodically carried out by elements of the Presidential Guard, the RECCE battalion<sup>24</sup> and some elements of the gendarmerie".<sup>25</sup>

The prior existence of these lists supports the hypothesis that the psychological shock provoked by the assassination of the President will facilitate the act of the regime's hardliners and militiamen.

**A civil defence plan is developed involving the distribution of weapons to the militia...**

French Colonel Gilbert Canova, adviser to the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan army, in a report dated April 30<sup>rd</sup> 1991, conceived the organization of a civil defense plan which provided for local authorities, at a very decentralized level, to be responsible for organizing the population in popular self-defense structures formed by the RAF (Rwandan Armed Force).<sup>26</sup> The enemy is the RPF and its infiltrators. The territorial coverage implied by such a civil defense plan contributed significantly to the effectiveness of the genocide by trapping the Tutsi populations on the spot.

**RTLTM radio broadcast of 3 April, announcing a small thing**

On April 3<sup>rd</sup>, RTLTM<sup>27</sup> announced that "on the 3<sup>rd</sup>, the 4<sup>th</sup>, and the 5<sup>th</sup>, it is expected that a small thing will happen here in Kigali, and even they [the Tutsis] will go on and rest on the 6<sup>th</sup>, and on the 7<sup>th</sup> and the 8<sup>th</sup>, they will do a small thing, using these bullets and grenades..."<sup>28</sup> A curious message which, in the hollow, reveals the date of the attack. Either RTLTM anticipated an RPF action, which means that on the date of the 3<sup>rd</sup>, it is almost certain that something will happen on the 6<sup>th</sup>, or RTLTM relays a coded message in order to prepare the actors of the infernal machine to get ready to take action.

It is undeniable that the supporters of the Hutu Power had prepared themselves both logistically and in terms of arms supplies, including the import of USD 525'000 worth of machetes from Kenya by Félicien Kabuga, a wealthy businessman, close to Habyarimana and a shareholder of RTLTM.<sup>29</sup> But these facts are not directly attributable to the attack on the Falcon.

**Facts that could incriminate the RPF supporters**

**Closure of the western access to the Kigali airstrip**

On January 8, 1994, during the party at the Meridien Hotel to celebrate the installation of the Belgian battalion of UNAMIR, the Belgian commander Wim Schellings, pilot of the C-130 based in Kigali, took off on his own initiative and performed a few passes at very, very low altitude over the Meridien Hotel and ... the CND<sup>30</sup>. On the third pass, the RPF opened fire on the C-130.

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<sup>24</sup> RECCE: reconnaissance battalion. Elite RAF Troop.

<sup>25</sup> Jacques Morel, *ibidem*, p.214.

<sup>26</sup> Jacques Morel, *ibidem*, p.205.

<sup>27</sup> RTLTM: Radiotélévision des Mille Collines, an extremist radio station openly calling for the extermination of Tutsis.

<sup>28</sup> Jacques Morel, *ibidem*, p.267.

<sup>29</sup> Jacques Morel, *ibidem*, p.683.

<sup>30</sup> CND: Conseil national de développement (ie the parliament). Building were a 600 soldiers RPF force was located according to the Arusha accords.

Dallaire concluded that the approach to the airport from the west<sup>31</sup> should be condemned, forcing all aircraft to land only from the east.<sup>32</sup> This fact may seem trivial, but from two approaches (west or east), there is only one (east) left. The reopening of the western access was never considered by Dallaire.

### **US Rangers pre-positioned in Bujumbura**

From mid-March, a detachment of US Rangers, elite soldiers from the US army, were reported to have arrived in Bujumbura in neighboring Burundi. This arrival came unexpectedly, without the usual diplomatic preconditions.<sup>33</sup> This fact is also pointed out by Colonel Marchal, who received it from the US ambassador in Kigali, David Rawson himself,<sup>34</sup> by the French gendarmerie colonel Robardey, then technical adviser to the judicial police of Rwanda,<sup>35</sup> and by the journalist Ngeze, openly anti-Tutsi, in a book that has not been translated into French.<sup>36</sup> Ngeze was sentenced to 35 years imprisonment by the ICTR and is serving his sentence in Mali.<sup>37</sup>

The presence of these US Rangers in Burundi before the attack is curious. Moreover, Ambassador Rawson mentions US Rangers, even though it was the Marines on board the USS Peleliu (LHA-5) of the 11<sup>th</sup> Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) that evacuated American nationals from Kigali to Bujumbura by land during Operation Distant Runner.<sup>38</sup> There were therefore two American units: the US Rangers before the attack and the Marines for the evacuation of nationals after the attack. However, the evacuation of civilians is not exactly the specialty of the US Rangers because they do not have the necessary logistics, unlike the Marines of the 11<sup>th</sup> MEU, which have helicopters and transport planes.

The specialty of the US Rangers is clandestine actions. In Vietnam, for example, they were the backbone of the LRRP (Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol).<sup>39</sup> These are patrols lasting several days, even weeks, behind enemy lines. From then on, a more operational role could be considered, such as an infiltrated commando behind the lines with the mission of shooting down the aircraft. By road, from the border with Burundi, it is roughly fifty kilometers to Kigali. Most of the RAF units are located north and north-east of Kigali, so access from the south should be relatively easy. Although there are no facts to corroborate this hypothesis - other than the presence of the US Rangers in Bujumbura as part of a deception maneuver - some actions are taken to remain undetectable. It is not because they are not detected that it is not plausible to consider them. The presence of these 250 US Rangers from mid-March also contributes to the increased political pressure on Habyarimana.

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<sup>31</sup> Colonel Luc Marchal, *ibidem*, p.140.

<sup>32</sup> There is only one airport runway in Kigali oriented West-East.

<sup>33</sup> Lugan Bernard, *L'Afrique réelle*, n°31, July 2012, p.20 Testimony of Déo Ngendahayo, former head of the Burundian intelligence services.

<sup>34</sup> Colonel Luc Marchal, *ibidem*, p.247.

<sup>35</sup> Lugan Bernard, *L'Afrique réelle*, n°31, juillet 2012, page 20.

<sup>36</sup> <http://www.france-rwanda.info/2016/05/rwanda-ukuri-kwahishuwe-igitabo-gishya-cya-hassan-ngeze.html> p.166.

<sup>37</sup> <https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/hassan-ngeze>

<sup>38</sup> [www.mca-marines.org/leatherneck/1994/06/africa-11th-meu-marines-evacuate-americans-rwanda](http://www.mca-marines.org/leatherneck/1994/06/africa-11th-meu-marines-evacuate-americans-rwanda)

<sup>39</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-range\\_reconnaissance\\_patrol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-range_reconnaissance_patrol)

**The marines of the 11th MEU remain at sea**

On March 13, 1994, US General Shalikashvili asked the Marines of the 11<sup>th</sup> Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the USS Peleliu to prepare for another six weeks at sea.<sup>40</sup> These Marines had participated in the evacuation of the last American nationals in Somalia shortly before. They were the ones who will evacuate American citizens via Bujumbura as part of Operation Distant Runner. This may therefore be a measure in anticipation of the deterioration of the crisis.

**Kibat 2 is operationally weakened**

The first soldiers of Kibat 2<sup>41</sup> arrived on 9 March 1994 to take over from Kibat 1. Belgian Colonel Luc Marchal, UNAMIR's Kigali sector commander, identified several elements that, when taken together, contributed to the weakening of Kibat 2's operational capability:

- Kibat 2 has no support to attach its machine guns to the jeeps. Kibat 1 left with its own and Kibat 2 left its supports in Belgium.
- The first battalion did not replace any of the ammunition fired, which reduced the amount to about 30% of what it should have been.<sup>42</sup>
- Why do the men have a much more restrictive and constraining view of the rules of engagement than those I gave at my briefing on 29 March 1994?
- Why, while the red alert was being applied for the whole of UNAMIR, did Colonel Jo Dewez, in accordance with the operational procedures, didn't set up his delta team, which should have enabled him to have an intervention reserve of forty to fifty men at his disposal?<sup>43</sup>

The Belgian battalion was considered to be the backbone of UNAMIR in Rwanda. The other elements, notably the Bangladeshis, were considered totally unfit from a military point of view. Put together (faulty armament, lack of ammunition, failure to set up the delta team), these facts contributed to weaken Kibat 2.

**The RAF, positioned north of Kigali, are not in a position to face an RPF offensive.**

*"I am deeply concerned about General Nsambinana and I can understand that the situation of the RAF is a cause for concern. What I saw on the tactical positions, which are supposed to block the infiltration axes towards the capital, is a distressing spectacle from a military point of view. My conclusion is simple: these units are unfit to carry out their mission. I fear that the RPF will start a war in the coming days. Unfortunately, the information at my disposal leaves no room for doubt. For several weeks now, it has been stockpiling ammunition and equipment along the border in Uganda,*

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<sup>40</sup> <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1994/Shalikashvili-Bids-Troops-Farewell-Asks-Navy-to-Remain/id-9865cd2660cf95810578e49c06900522>

<sup>41</sup> Kibat : *Kigali Battalion*, name given to the Belgian unit overseeing the city of Kigali.

<sup>42</sup> Colonel Luc Marchal, *ibidem*, p.162

<sup>43</sup> Colonel Luc Marchal, *ibidem*, p.277

*in fact everything needed to support military operations. The RPF is a revolutionary movement, and it is as such that it reasons and defines its objectives".*<sup>44</sup>

One should not rule out the possibility that these military preparations by the RPF, are part of a Reflexive Control<sup>45</sup> operation aimed at destabilizing the RAF and pushing them to commit the irrecoverable as an attack on their president. But if the RAF offers a distressing spectacle, then it must be understood that they are not in a position to oppose an offensive. So to provoke it would be suicidal.

#### **Preparations for the evacuation of American citizens began before the attack...**

Charles Vukovic, a US military attaché stationed in Cameroon, arrived in Kigali on April 5 to prepare the evacuation of US nationals. Linda Melvern mentions an arrival on the 5<sup>th</sup>,<sup>46</sup> Strizek and Lugan mention April 6<sup>th</sup>.<sup>47</sup>

This could be a preventive measure knowing that if Habyarimana persisted in demanding a seat for the CDR in the NTA, the RPF had a legitimate reason to resume the offensive, although it is difficult to imagine just two days after the Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMIR for three months and the ambassadors in Kigali have somehow softened the CDR's involvement in the NTA.

One can hardly rule out the hypothesis of a coincidence, especially since this fact is reported by Linda Melvern, who cannot be suspected of sympathy for the Hutu Power.

This arrival is disturbing because, if it anticipates an action by Hutu Power, Ambassador Rawson should have warned Habyarimana. It may also be a particularly cynical message to the Hutu Power to get him to set off the infernal machine: *"You see, we knew the Falcon was going to be shot"*.

#### **The mysterious journey in the Akagera Park**

On the morning of April 6<sup>th</sup>, a mission went to the Akagera Park (north-east) to examine demolished tourism infrastructure on behalf of the UNDP.<sup>48</sup> It was composed of RPF and RAF delegates and was escorted by two Belgian Blue Helmets jeeps commanded by Lieutenant Lotin.<sup>49</sup> Belgian soldier Didier Lefebvre, heard on January 15<sup>th</sup> 1999 by a Belgian judicial police officer, recounts: *"on April 6<sup>th</sup> 1994, we were entrusted with a mission. I went with Lieutenant Lotin and my colleagues to the CND in Kigali. I was in Lieutenant Lotin's jeep and we had to escort another jeep in which there were 5 Rwandans on board. These people were dressed in civilian clothes"*. On the surface, it appears to be a

<sup>44</sup> Colonel Luc Marchal, *ibidem*, p.210.

<sup>45</sup> Reflexive Control: method developed by the Soviet cybernetician Vladimir Lefebvre, author of Algebra of conscience. The purpose of Reflexive Control is similar to that of deception: to lead a target to take a decision that is contrary to its interests.

<sup>46</sup> Linda Melvern, *ibidem*, p.128 « As the security Council meeting was taking place that day a US defense attaché based in the Cameroon, turned up in Kigali with a noncombatant evacuation order, or NEO, to ensure that all 257 US citizens were safely rescued from Rwanda ».

<sup>47</sup> Bernard Lugan, *ibidem*, p.20.

<sup>48</sup> Brewaeys Philippe, Rwanda 1994. Noirs et Blancs menteurs, Editions racine RTBF, 2013, page 72.

<sup>49</sup> Jacques Morel, *ibidem*, p.303.

simple routine mission. However, neither Colonel Marchal, who ordered the escorts, nor Major Norbert de Loecker, who assigned them, remember ordering a mission in the Akagera that day.<sup>50</sup>

This mysterious journey was suspected of having allowed the introduction of the two missiles, but this seems difficult because there were two government representatives aboard the jeep who, in this hypothesis, should have been accomplices. We should add that since the jeeps were not covered, it was difficult to hide two missile cases in them.

If the purpose of this mission was not to bring back missiles, what is certain is that once the plane was shot down, the anger of the RAF naturally turned on the Belgians to the point that ten of them would be assassinated, including Lieutenant Lotin and his men. Belgian Colonel Balis says nothing else: *"The death of the Belgian soldiers is a coldly premeditated assassination. We knew that the Belgians were in danger. That the Hutu extremists were speculating that if some soldiers died, Brussels would recall the contingent. And that is exactly what happened"*.<sup>51</sup> It took the deaths of 10 paratroopers for Belgium to decide to withdraw its contingent.

**A Belgian C-130 on approach to Kigali leads the Presidential Falcon to take a normal approach.**

The Falcon pilots were officers of the French air force. Aware of the risks associated with an attack with a ground-to-air missile, they had begun to adopt unusual approaches designed to lure a possible shooter:<sup>52</sup> *"Approach with all lights off, runway lighting off, landing lights on and the required lighting on short final a few seconds before touchdown. This is not in accordance with the rules of the air, which the crew was avoiding in this case for safety reasons"*.<sup>53</sup>

However, on 6 April 1994, when the Falcon was on approach to Kigali airport, a Belgian C-130 that had taken off from the Belgian air base at Melsbroeck at 4.47 a.m. arrived in Cairo for a stopover at 10.55 a.m. It took off again from Cairo at 12:07 a.m. and arrived normally in Kigali around 8:00 p.m. local time. The crew was composed of Belgian military personnel including the captain (Wildeman), co-pilot (Fink) and flight engineer (Veracruz). President Habyarimana's plane was expected to arrive at Kigali airport at about 20:15. The C-130 arriving at almost the same time did not receive landing clearance. It should be recalled that the attack took place at about 20:20. The aircraft, which reportedly announced itself at the last minute, without having sent any flight plan to Kigali, therefore flew over Rwandan territory without landing from 20:00 to 20:45. The aircraft was not allowed to land.<sup>54</sup>

According to magistrates Nathalie Poux and Marc Trevidic: *"The pilots [of the Falcon] did not choose one of the types of approach envisaged to deal*

<sup>50</sup> Jacques Morel, *ibidem*, p.303.

<sup>51</sup> <http://francegenocidetutsi.org/2007-04-05LeSoirLedernierjourdenosparasauRwandaEmmanuelRuziganaSeRetracteCBraeckman.pdf>

<sup>52</sup> Cour d'appel de Paris, tribunal de grande instance de Paris. Rapport d'expertise, « Destruction en vol du Falcon 50 Kigali (Rwanda) », Magistrats Nathalie Poux, Marc Trevidic, 21 avril 2010, p.180.

<sup>53</sup> Cour d'appel de Paris, *ibidem*, p.166.

<sup>54</sup> Onana Charles, *La France dans la terreur rwandaise*, éditions Duboiris, 2014, p.212.

*with a possible threat, but made a direct and normal approach. The presence of a United Nations C-130 in the area of the Kigali airport may also have prompted them to carry out this direct approach to avoid any risk of collision, as Kigali air traffic control does not have the capacity to ensure separation between aircraft due to the lack of radar*".<sup>55</sup> Equipped with a single ILS,<sup>56</sup> the control tower can only line up aircrafts one after the other to avoid any collision.

There are 3,554 kilometers between Cairo and Kigali. The average speed of the C-130, based on the first flight segment, is 523 km/h. Therefore, leaving Cairo at 12:07, with the same average speed, the C-130 should have arrived in Kigali at 18:55. However, it arrived at 20:15, which means that its average speed was 437 km/h, i.e. 16.4% slower.<sup>57</sup> This could be a coincidence, but the difference in cruising speed between Melsbroeck and Cairo (average 523 km/h) and between Cairo and Kigali (average 437 km/h) is significant. What is certain is that the presence of the C-130 prompted the Falcon pilots to adopt a normal approach.

**Shortly after the attack, the RAF headquarter was disarmed and decapitated.**

On April 6<sup>th</sup>, at approximately 22:00, a meeting was held at the RAF headquarter. It was attended by officers from the RAF, Dallaire and Marchal and later in the evening a visit was also made to Booh-Booh's home. Marchal recalls: "*When, on April 6<sup>th</sup> 1994, shortly after the presidential plane was shot down, I found myself at the RAF headquarters where a crisis committee was meeting, at no time did I have the feeling that we were in a coup scenario. Despite the years, my memory of those moments, when we were wondering which way the situation would tip, is still very vivid in my mind. I know that I found myself in front of men who were distraught by what had just happened. A way of behaving, an intonation of voice, a doubt expressed, an expression on the face, a question that makes one perceive anxiety in the face of the unknown are signs that do not deceive. I included, without much hesitation, Colonel Bagosora in this assessment, at least during the first two or three hours after the death of the Head of State. It is my firm conviction that, had the organizers of the attack been around the table, this meeting would have unfolded in a completely different manner. Moreover, I doubt that, in that eventuality, UNAMIR would have been invited to participate*".<sup>58</sup>

Moreover, on the evening of the attack, besides President Habyarimana and Chief of Staff Nsambinana who disappeared in the crash, "*the Minister of Defence and the G2 officer - the one who centralizes all military intelligence - are in Cameroon and the G3 officer - operations - is in Egypt*".<sup>59</sup>

It is difficult to see a part of Hutu Power taking the risk of an armed confrontation with the RPF with which the military balance of power has always

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<sup>55</sup> Cour d'appel de Paris, *ibidem*, p.180.

<sup>56</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrument\\_landing\\_system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrument_landing_system)

<sup>57</sup> See appendix, C-130 cruise speed calculation.

<sup>58</sup> Jacques Marchal, p. 303.

<sup>59</sup> Péan Pierre, *Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs*, Rwanda 1990 - 1994, Editions Pluriel, mars 2014, p. 240.

been unfavorable<sup>60</sup>, with an almost complete absence of leadership at the top of the state, even though there were significant dissensions within the officer corps.

### **Delay in the ignition of the infernal machine**

If Hutu Power was behind the attack, why wait until the morning of the 7th to begin the targeted assassinations? Marchal, again, notes: "*When I returned to my headquarters shortly after 2 a.m., I was struck by the calm that reigned in Kigali. We are far from the usual soundscape of the capital, punctuated by explosions and gunfire. The route we take is empty of any roadblocks and a quarter of an hour is enough to make the return trip*".<sup>61</sup> However, witnesses report that the roadblock was set up thirty minutes after the crash and that the shots were attributed to the Presidential Guard (GP). That the GP reacted violently is not surprising, it was entirely devoted to the protection of Habyarimana. Kigali is a small city and the hills echo the sounds. That calm reigns at 2 o'clock in the morning on April 7 indicates that the infernal machine has not yet started. Otherwise, there would have been exchanges of fire, even sporadic ones.

### **The RPF blitzkrieg offensive to condemn the border with Tanzania**

Two days after the attack, from its bases in the north, the RPF launched a broad offensive that was deployed on two axes: the first towards Kigali, to stop the killings, and the second towards southeastern Rwanda to condemn the border with Tanzania. On April 15<sup>th</sup>, the RPF occupied Kayonza, cutting off all communication with Tanzania and forcing civilians to flee westwards towards the DRC<sup>62</sup>, creating great confusion on the roads and limiting the already weak capacity of maneuver of the RAF.

Such an offensive must be prepared, especially in terms of logistics. Setting more than 15'000 soldiers<sup>63</sup> in motion requires food, equipment and ammunition supply. This cannot be improvised. If we look at what happened afterwards in North and South Kivu, we cannot help not to see a link. Finally, there has been a lot of speculation to try to demonstrate that the RPF troops went on the offensive just after the attack, or even before. On the contrary, by waiting until April 7<sup>th</sup> at 17:00 to get out of their CND barracks [in Kigali] and set the first units in the North [on April 8<sup>th</sup>] in motion, this delay allowed the infernal machine to start moving irreversibly.

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<sup>60</sup> With each RPF offensive, the Habyarimana regime has been saved thanks to the intervention of the French armed forces.

<sup>61</sup> Colonel Luc Marchal, p.220.

<sup>62</sup> A novel of Rwanda, Xlibris, p.66. "On 6 April the RPA - the army of the Rwandan patriotic Front - occupied only a small area in the north of Rwanda. But the onset of the genocide on the seventh of April triggered an RPA offensive. Little resistance was encountered as they swept down the east of the country. By the twenty-fifth of April they occupied Kibungo. Three days later, the twenty-eighth of April, they took Rusumo and the countryside through which the main road to Tanzania winds its way to the only bridge across the Akagera."

<sup>63</sup> Defense Intelligence report, "Rwanda: the Rwandan Patriotic Front's Offensive", 9 May 1994, 7 pages

**The shrapnel vest of Sergeant Patrick Van Moyden, a MISTRAL missile specialist, is found in Cyangugu.**

In his highly critical work on Operation Turquoise, Lieutenant-Colonel Ancel<sup>64</sup> relates a surprising fact. While on patrol on July 11<sup>th</sup> 1994 with legionnaires in the Cyangugu region (South-Western Rwanda), he found himself confronted by a group of militiamen: *"One of the militiamen turned towards me and provoked me with his eyes, he was wearing a bloody flak jacket, in the camouflage of the Belgian army with the patronymic band of Sergeant 'P. Van Moyden'. Sergeant Patrick Van Moyden was training with us in Germany four years earlier when we were experiencing the Mistral in the Wittlich area. It was the first portable anti-aircraft missile of the French army; the Belgians had also bought it so as not to depend only on the American Stinger and wanted to test it at the same time as us. They had detached us Patrick, a young Flemish man appreciated for his professionalism and his jovial temperament. I had heard that he was part of the escort of the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, opposed to the extremists. An escort that the Belgian soldiers paid for with their lives"*.<sup>65</sup>

This testimony is curious because this name does not appear in the list of the ten Belgian commandos assassinated on the morning of April 7<sup>th</sup>, 1994.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, Patrick Van Moyden would be Flemish according to Ancel whereas the soldiers of Kibat 2 are Walloon (French speaking).

In addition, a doubt prevailed on April 7th over the number of Belgian victims: *"General Dallaire believes that in the early afternoon, he was warned by Col Marchal that 13 Belgians had been killed in the Kigali camp. This information could not at that time be verified"*<sup>67</sup>. He also states that around 21:00, General Ndindiliyimana received confirmation of the death of the Belgians and that in his company, he went to the hospital in Kigali where he discovered, around 23:15, the intermingled bodies of Belgian soldiers that he believed corresponded to 11 mortal remains. *The manner in which the bodies were piled up would not have allowed him to determine the exact number of victims, namely ten or eleven"*.<sup>68</sup> If Ancel's testimony is true then the presence of a MISTRAL missile specialist is troubling and must be verified.

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<sup>64</sup> He's leaving the army with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was a captain at the time of Operation Turquoise.

<sup>65</sup> Ancel Guillaume, *Rwanda, la fin du silence. Témoignage d'un officier français*, Les belles Lettres, Mémoires de Guerre, Paris, 2018, pp. 81-82.

<sup>66</sup> [http://www.cdomuseum.be/francais/09\\_fr.htm](http://www.cdomuseum.be/francais/09_fr.htm) (descendre la page, 1<sup>er</sup> quart) // <https://fr.novopress.info/162133/il-y-a-20-ans-le-massacre-des-para-commandos-belges-au-rwanda>

<sup>67</sup> Amadou Deme, "Rwanda 1994 and the failure of the United Nations Mission", CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, pp. 77-78.

<sup>68</sup> Commission parlementaire concernant les événements du Rwanda, 1997-12-06, Belgique, p. 269.



### Origin of the firing of the two missiles



There has been a lot of controversy in trying to identify the origin of the missiles with the idea that this question would help identify the shooters. But it was a futile controversy because both sides were likely to have some. The RPF had shot down an observation plane BN 2A-21 at Matimba on October 7<sup>th</sup> 1990 and a Gazelle SA 342M helicopter at Nyakayaga near Gabiro on October 23<sup>th</sup> 1990.<sup>69</sup> If the attack had been carried out by Hutu Power with the help of foreign mercenaries, no doubt it would have found the means to acquire such missiles.

As to the origin of the shooting, according to the expert report by Poux and Trevidic, a shot from Kanombe seems most likely. For their investigation, they considered several locations from which the missiles could have been fired and only the edge of the Kanombe military camp and the Massaka hill are suitable. With a shot from Kanombe, the missile would have been partially fired from the front, whereas from Massaka it would have hit the Falcon from the rear.

According to the report, the firing positions<sup>70</sup> at Massaka offer the advantage of good acquisition of the infrared radiation emitted by the reactors. It is the best position of all those they studied, but it is discarded because:

1. The missile, arriving from behind, would not have been able to hit the underside of the left wing, would have destroyed the reactors, which showed no impact, and the kerosene in the tank would not have exploded, forming the fireball that several witnesses observed.
2. The sounds of the missiles' departure could not be heard distinctly due to the distance of these positions from the reference witness.

<sup>69</sup> Jacques Morel, *ibidem*, p.279.

<sup>70</sup> Positions n°3 and n°4. The report takes into account several positions located in the same zone. For the sake of clarity, this level of detail is not taken into account.

With regard to the positions from the Kanombe camp, in terms of the infrared radiation seen by the missile, it may be more difficult to lock the target than for the Massaka positions. This is especially the case of single-engine fighter jets installed in the airframe axis. In the Falcon 50 configuration, the hot source produced by the three engines is higher and the flow area is significantly increased. The radiative energy is only partially masked by the airframe of the aircraft. It was therefore possible to attach this emissive source from these firing positions. More difficult but plausible firing positions because:

1. The missile can strike the underside of the left wing to explode in the corresponding part of the kerosene tank explaining the formation of the fireball that accompanied the aircraft in its fall.
2. Visual acquisition of the aircraft is possible for a sufficiently long time for the shooter to initiate the firing procedure, resulting in the target's hot source being hooked up.
3. The distances of the aircraft at the time of hooking and firing are well within the operational range of the ground-to-air weapon system selected.
4. The sound of the departure of the missiles is heard distinctly before the vision of the explosion of the aircraft, by the witnesses present in the Pasuch house.

However, these conclusions do not make it possible to identify the perpetrators of the shootings, even though for the RPF movement, the origin of the shooting from Kanombe points to the Hutu Power, because since the Kanombe camp is monitored by the RAF, an RPF commando could not be positioned there.

But this argument is debatable because on Google Earth, even today, south of the camp, a fairly large green space is located. If we take into account that night falls around 18:30 at this latitude and that there must not have been much public lighting at that time, we cannot rule out the possibility that a commando infiltrated this location. Moreover, Poux and Trevidic do not rule out this hypothesis when they state: "*The fact that we favor these two positions n°2 and n°6 does not mean that **the missiles could not have been technically implemented in a slightly larger perimeter.** We consider that a area extended towards the East and South, **of the order of a hundred meters or more, provided that the terrain is clear towards the aircraft's approach axis, can be taken into account**".<sup>71</sup>*

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<sup>71</sup> Nathalie Poux, Marc Trevidic, *ibidem*, p.313.

## Camp de KANOMBE.

1 = Villa de HABYARIMANA  
 2 = Maison où se trouvait le témoin PASUCH.



The wooded area is part of Camp Kanombé but the whole area below (dotted yellow) offers good conditions (no trees). Photographic file: Habyarimana assassination. Belgian Military Auditorate.<sup>72</sup>

We will leave it to the reader to draw the conclusions he or she wishes. However, if the aim of a deception operation is to remain concealed, even after it has been carried out, the facts presented here constitute a scenario that has indeed taken place. While this investigation does not allow a definitive conclusion to be reached, it does bring together elements that support the thesis that it was indeed pro RPF perpetrators that were behind the missile launch with discreet but decisive support from Belgium and the United States. Therefore, the following questions cannot remain unanswered forever:

**C-130:** why was the average speed lower on the Cairo - Kigali section?

**Ten or thirteen Belgian soldiers:** why did several witnesses, the Togolese captain Apedo Kodio and the RAF gendarmerie general Ndindlyimana count thirteen bodies?

**Charles Vukovic:** why did the preparation for the evacuation of American nationals begin before the attack?

**Exit from the Akagera:** what was the real objective of the journey to the Akagera park?

**Sergeant Patrick Van Moyden's flak jacket:** what was he doing in Rwanda? And how did he get there?

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<sup>72</sup> [http://francegenocidetutsi.org/Annexe\\_7\\_Dossier\\_photographique\\_No\\_K0075674-K0075686E.pdf](http://francegenocidetutsi.org/Annexe_7_Dossier_photographique_No_K0075674-K0075686E.pdf)

**Weakening of Kibat 2:** why didn't Jo Dewez set up his delta team and why doesn't Kibat 2 have any support to fix its machine guns on the jeeps?

**US Rangers:** why were they pre-positioned in Bujumbura by mid-March?

Without false modesty, KAGAME stated:

*"We used communication and information warfare better than anyone. We have found a new way of doing things".<sup>73</sup>*

## Annexes

### C-130 Cruise Speed Calculation

Journey	Departure <sup>74</sup>	Distance	Speed	Duration	Arrival
Melsbroeck -Cairo	04h47	3'208 km	523 km/h	6h08	10h55
Cairo - Kigali	12h07	3'554 km	523 km/h	6h48	18h55
Cairo - Kigali	12h07	3'554 km	437 km/h	8h08	20h15

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<sup>73</sup> In Nik Gowing, *"New challenges and problems for information management in complex emergencies: ominous lessons from the Great Lakes and eastern Zaire in late 1996 and early 1997"* (Paper presented at conference on Dispatches from Disaster Zones, Oxford, 28 May 1998), p. 4.

<https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/110/438/1/78893/Constructing-the-truth-dealing-with-dissent>

<sup>74</sup> There is no time difference between Belgium, Egypt and Rwanda.